

## **A COMPARISON OF MEAD'S "SELF" AND HEIDEGGER'S "DASEIN": TOWARD A REGROUNDING OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY <sup>1</sup>**

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### **Introduction**

George Herbert Mead's concept of self has been a major focal point of research in social psychology since the 1920s. Mead related the origins of the self to communication and language development. Mead sought a scientifically based, empirical model of the self which nevertheless allowed for a view of the human being as a reflective actor. Mead's concept of self has had a great impact on research in social science which has viewed the self and its role enactments as the key conceptual linkage between the individual and social structure.

Mead thought that the scientific perspective of hypothesis testing could be successfully applied to human action. Much like the "father" of sociology, Auguste Comte, Mead believed that progress would follow from the application of scientific method to human society:

We of the modern world could accept a catastrophe of our own institutions and assume that out of it might arise a better invention, a more intelligent control of things. The rationality of man and the universe makes it possible for us to accept defeat without despair (1938:640).

Mead moved beyond narrow positivism, however, in that he demonstrated that all scientific perspectives are relative to a human observor (Eames, 1973:174). He makes it clear that even objects at a distance, like the planets, are looked upon in terms of the human observor:

That is, we give to the hypothetical contact object at a distance the date of the manipulatory area, while the date that belongs to it is that of the achieved act (1938:174).

In addition, Mead viewed the subject-object relationship as processual. Still, there is always first of all a subject which reaches out to an object, since Mead wished to explain mind and self as products of behavioral interaction. Mead, as a theorist of the self, takes the posture of the detached scientific observer.

The conceptual framework upon which research is based dramatically effects the kinds of questions asked and the kinds of findings which result. Mead's research on the self asks questions such as the following: What are the expectations and attributions of significant others toward the self? How does the self look at these attributions and expectations using its reflective intelligence? <sup>Did</sup> the self unquestioningly internalize the attributions and expectations of others? How does the self use objects? How does this self relate to societal and institutional expectations? On the cultural level – what are societal expectations of individual selves? How does the child internalize the attributions and expectations of others through play and games? How does the self act in the present in relation to the past and the future? What objects are constituted through the symbolic communication between self and others?

The answers research has provided to such questions has illustrated the social situatedness of the self and the interconnection between communication, language, and awareness of self. It has triggered inquiry into the social constitution of emotions. Important as such insights may be, they do not give an adequate picture of human experience in the world. Such a picture could be fleshed out were social psychological research to follow a Heideggerian line of questioning.

In contrast to Mead, Heidegger is critical of modern science, which he views as an extension of Greek metaphysics cultivated by Descartes' "cogito". Reaching back to the pre-Socratics, Heidegger revives the question of Being. The Greek and Christian view of the human as body, mind and spirit begs the question of the meaning of Being. Similarly, Descartes had ignored the issue <sup>of</sup> who it is who thinks. Anthropology's man as a rational animal similarly denies the question of what kind of being it is who is rational. ~~Positive~~ research holds being as self-evident: <sup>Positivistic</sup>

Subjecting the manifold to tabulation does not ensure any actual understanding of what lies before us as thus set in order (1962: 77).

Our distinctions will necessarily be inadequate from the standpoint of "scientific theory" simply because the scientific structure of the above-mentioned disciplines (not, indeed, the "scientific attitude" of those who seek to advance them) is today thoroughly questionable and needs to be attacked in new ways which must have their source in ontological problematics (ibid., 71).

To Heidegger, the denial or neglect of the question of Being is a critical flaw in Western thought which tends to conceptually fragment knowledge of the world and the human person. Heidegger's intellectual quest is ontological – the desire to approach the nature of Being as the grounding of all that exists in multiple manifestations. Being in general, and other particular beings may be known only through the existing human being – Dasein.<sup>2</sup>

Heidegger's ontology begins with an analysis of Dasein. It would be a distortion to view Heidegger's existential phenomenology as "subjectivistic", since his ontology recognizes from the start that inner and outer, body and mind, self and other, subject and object are one. These typical dichotomies are the result of the dualisms prevalent in Western metaphysics and its languages. Instead Dasein feels and knows about the world, with which it is one.

Heidegger's phenomenological method thinks on the nature of Dasein understanding itself and the world. All knowledge is grounded in Dasein's experiencing of it. Therefore, a phenomenology of Dasein must preface a phenomenology of any other kind of being. Heidegger elucidated *how* Dasein experiences itself as existing in the world.

Research following a conception of the human being as Dasein would ask questions such as the following: What modes of being-in occur normally in the daily life of this Dasein – such as discussions, evasions, passivity, neglect? In what moods is this Dasein typically? In and with what objects, others and things does Dasein concern itself? In a manner of pragmatic detachment, or of responsible caring? In what sense does this Dasein choose its mode of existence (resoluteness)? Does Dasein use language originally and poetically to try to capture and appreciatively understand the world, or does Dasein merely reiterate lifeless clichés?

How does Dasein experience time? What is considered right or wrong time? How aware is this Dasein of the particularity of a specific passing of time? How does time relate in sequence to the past and the future? How aware is Dasein of the communality of time? Does a particular cultural-situational context acknowledge or deny the facticity of death?

How is temporality experienced at various points in the life cycle? What pathways does Dasein cross over in time? How can authenticity be nurtured in the child, the adolescent, and throughout the life cycle?

The focus on Mead's scientific concept of self has led research in social psychology to focus on questions within the realm of the self as an object. This way of understanding human existence overlooks the ontological wellspring of the knowing self. This paper presents a comparison of key themes in Heidegger's ontology of Dasein and George Herbert Mead's social psychology. While it was Heidegger's intent to reveal the necessary basis of existence, a theory of social psychology of actually existent human beings is thereby implied.

As Mead cleverly conceived a social psychology based on behaviorist ways of knowing, his unstated ontology posits discrete entities confronting and then manipulating alien objects. Heidegger's description of the nature of being reveals humans as temporality in which the world with others occurs in manifold abundances. It is important to compare Heidegger's ontology with Mead's social psychology because of the impact of Meadian thought on social science. The attempt here is not to reduce the ontological task to social psychology. Rather, it is hoped that Heidegger's ontology will allow a clearing to be made towards a social psychology which allows a fuller realization of human beings in their social world.

### **Dasein exists as being in the world**

Dasein's activities are world centered. Tools, objects, plants, animals, other beings, and other Dasein's all exist from the outset within and without Dasein. Dasein does not first exist as a subject who then interacts with other subjects. Nor does Dasein first exist apart from the ready-to-hand, the objects of the world. Rather all *are* the world as ontologically pregiven.

Being-in for Dasein is fundamentally different from a spatial concept, such as a pencil in a box or a letter in an envelope. Rather, the connotation derives from "inner" that is "to reside". It contains the implications of dwelling, familiarity, existing alongside of something, caring for something (1962:79-80). Being-in is not a unitary concept. Rather, it is a multiplicity which includes such manners of being-in as: "having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, discussing, determining ... leaving

undone, neglecting, renouncing, taking a rest ..." (1962:83). All of these are varieties of concern but they are deficient. This is because Dasein does not exist as an entity first which then relates to the world. Rather, everything is already inherent to Dasein as being-in-the-world (1962:84). Everyday life <sup>occasions a false de-realization</sup> that one already is the other who one speaks harshly to or admires, the object one preserves or wastes, the animal one cherishes or eats. Heidegger's Dasein is not self-emersion:

When Dasein knows an object it does not get out of its inner sphere to gain knowledge of it. Dasein is already outside always alongside the entities it encounters. It does not abandon its inner sphere as it is alongside the object but is and remains inner to itself ...

And furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in receiving, retaining and preserving, the Dasein which knows *remains outside*, and it does so *as Dasein*. (1962:89 Italics are Heidegger's).

Even in thinking, Dasein is also "outside" in this manner.

Dasein does not choose to be in the world, but rather is *thrown* there. One is unavoidably and intrinsically related to a particular historical and social situation. Even in his or her non-recognition of the situation, Dasein is embedded in it. Through the power of speech, which is basic to all aspects of Dasein's existence, Dasein achieves understanding with varying degrees of authenticity. Understanding oneself as a returning toward what one most uniquely was, while at the same time projecting a future is "resoluteness" (1928:287), which is authentic existence. Contrarily, being absorbed in the immediate demands of everyday life is "fallenness". In the everyday state of fallenness we disregard our true individual having-been and projecting-toward, and become ~~wrapped around~~ <sup>enjoyed</sup> in daily trivia.

### Mead's self <sup>95</sup> and social

According to Mead, the "self" emerges, along with the mind, in a process of communication. As part of social interaction, the person takes the attitude of others towards himself or herself. The attributions and expectations of others constitute the "me" of the self (as object). The

"I" (as subject) reacts to these attitudes (1934:200). This socially aroused self-consciousness constitutes the Meadian self (1934:170 f.).

Even on the gestural level, organisms make mutual accommodations. Mead's favored example of a conversation of gestures is the dog fight. Avoidance of contact on a crowded street, relating to other vehicles in traffic, waving, shaking hands, are examples among human beings. When the human being is able to take the attitudes of the other toward his own gestures, it becomes a significant symbol, which relates self and object to idea or meaning (1934:47).

Mead makes the social genesis of self discernable. The key to the process is self-objectification. Repeatedly, Mead stresses the importance of "taking the attitude of the other toward the self" in the process. In early childhood, playing the role of significant others is crucial to the emerging self-concept. Later, the child is able to internalize the expectations of a "generalized other" by playing games governed by abstract rules. Thus long before the more rigorously demonstrated developmental theories of Piaget, Kohlberg and Lacan, Mead presented a cogent explanation for the emergence of the self in communication.

Mead <sup>never</sup> did not see the self as totally socially determined, ~~however~~. Human society does not merely stamp itself on the individual. Once the individual has a self, the reflective intelligence may direct itself upon the society, to try and effect change (1964:3f). Change occurs always in relating to different or expanded social groups. This theoretical attitude was implemented by Mead in his own life, for he was involved in social reform activities (Deegan and Burger, 1978). Mead believed that human beings were likely to gain broad perspective on themselves in relation to the world. As this process of "universalization" occurred, the prospects for world peace and ~~democracy~~ increased.

To Mead the self is a substantial entity, which centers the individual. This is evident in Mead's description of the way the self changes in response to a moral dilemma (1964:148-149). Mead describes the self as continually engaged in a struggle to accommodate to objects <sup>such</sup> as other, <sup>as</sup> things, or <sup>as</sup> one's own "me". For example, the self evaluates itself as "superior" or "inferior" based on a comparison with others. Indeed, simply meeting minimal requirements demanded by the community is not usually adequate for the maintenance of self respect. Although we attempt to cover up the childishness involved in such competitiveness we are actually "vastly gratified". Mead is careful to emphasize that this does not imply a morally despicable kind of ego-centeredness, but normal self-realization. However, Mead asserts:

... there is a demand, a constant demand, to realize one's self in some sort of superiority over those about us (1934:205).

Heidegger recognizes that such struggles exist but are perceived as such only in a state of "fallenness". Fallen from a state of caring, Dasein loses hold of itself as being-with-others. While Mead's social psychology stresses the necessity of the social relatedness of self, Heidegger's ontology posits self and other as an already unitary existence. If social psychology were to follow Heideggerian lines it would not need to find ways of connecting what its conceptual language had first distinguished. Rather, it could better describe the ebb and flow of social experience. Falling from a state of caring Dasein loses hold of itself as being-with-others.

### **Dasein is a being which chooses its own existence**

To be human is to achieve some self-understanding:

Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it ... Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being.

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence — in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting (Heidegger, 1962:32–33).

Here Heidegger emphasizes that one may possibly arrive at a sense of oneself nonthoughtfully. Still, in this non-active choosing, one in effect decides and determines the state of one's own existence. In choosing one's mode of being one may choose wrongly. To be oneself would require a consciously active choosing — that is to be "resolute". In resolute understanding, Dasein experiences the "augenblick" — a blink of the eye —. This is a moment of historical vision in which one's entire past and future are projected. Each present, as carrying one into the future, has meaning only insofar as one acknowledges one's ultimate death. In full awareness of death one truly possesses one's *own* life ("ownedness" or "mineness"). One no longer merely enacts the projec-

tions of others. Included as ones own are other beings as they are allowed to exist in time. An authentic existence with others is one of care (Sorge) (1982:287).

### **Mead's reflective intelligence**

Reflection arises in the temporary inhibition of action. In thought, the self can outline alternative courses of action:

Reflection or reflective behavior arises only under the conditions of self-consciousness, and makes possible the purposive control and organization by the individual organism of its conduct ... (1934:91)

Intelligence is reaction to the environment. Because of the possibility of reflection, action may be more than a response to stimuli. Mead uses the examples of the artist, the scientist and the religious prophet as evidence of the possibility for creative impact of the individual upon the social world (1934:214).

One may react without reflectivity. The concept of reflectivity is the closest Mead gets to approaching what Heidegger means by choosing ones own mode of being. Mead's concept of reflectivity says nothing about the consequences of nonrecognition of the ontological structure upon which ones identity rests. What Mead does provide is an explanation of *how* thought processes emerge through social interaction. Reflectivity may or may not develop as a critical capacity. Indeed, research indicates that a keenly critical reflectivity only develops in a minority of instances (Malhotra, ~~1980~~<sup>1977</sup>, 1983).

### **Dasein's everyday existence is primarily "inauthenticity"**

Dasein may exist in a state of authenticity or inauthenticity (ownedness or disownedness). Authenticity must be based on acceptance of one's essential emptiness and mortality and the feelings of anxiety and anguish which go along with such recognition (Angst). Authenticity is characterized by an attitude of gentle concern, where one responsibly aids other beings in following their own natures, as in cultivation. In a state of everydayness Dasein falls away from care and is appropriated by the "they" (Das Man) (1962:167f.). This is the



world of the anonymous "everyman". Heidegger states that he does not intend to disparage everydayness, but to disclose its ontological structures. However, this disclosure brings to light how far Dasein travels from its "ownedness" in its daily intercourse. Everydayness is a necessary aspect of being-in-the-world although it everywhere masks and prevents an authentic mode of being.

Heidegger clarifies by elucidating three signal aspects of everydayness: idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Idle talk closes off understanding of one's essential state and relationship to beings. It prevents understanding by assuming that it must be so because "they" said it. It thrives on repetition and gossip. Idle talk does not only occur on the telephone and over back-yard fences, but pervades the business conference, television and newspapers, textbooks, political speeches, professional conferences and even the classroom. It leaves essential tasks undone, for the assumption is made that talking is doing. Genuine understanding moves in, <sup>over</sup> ~~out~~ and against the prescriptive interpretations of everydayness. Even one's perceptions and states of mind or mood (Befindlichkeit) are designated by Das Man. The Dasein who lives in this state of idle talk is pulled up by the roots from its ontological soil. Human beings in such a state of groundlessness present themselves for observation as "selves" in current social scientific research. No wonder Goffman's variety of symbolic interaction (based on a Meadian social psychology) views the person as without essence and without character — as merely one who presents or "markets" him or herself.<sup>3</sup>

Everyday existence is also marked by "curiosity", which emphasizes "seeing". Terminologically there tends to be an equation between seeing and knowing. Curiosity is seeing as distraction. It moves from one novelty to the next, not to understand it, but merely to "take it in". Dasein in this state does not comprehend or care for the world, but is only entertained. Through curiosity, one can be asleep in relation to the world. Flying in a plane and viewing a landscape, seeing a movie, and passively watching television, may exemplify such modes of seeing. Such seeing is subject to the dictates of idle talk. "They" tell one what *should* be seen. Currently, the game "Trivia" epitomizes this mode of apprehending. Facts taken out of historical and situational contexts are simply remembered, not understood. Adolph Eichmann is just another "well-known personage" from the 1930s, like Babe Ruth in this celebrity-based way of viewing. One may, of course, view a television show in an authentic manner. The problem is that it becomes unclear whether one is really understanding because of the "ambiguous" nature of everydayness.

"Ambiguity" is precisely this difficulty in ascertaining the truthfulness and adequacy of ones knowing. Objects used, relationships, projects, possibilities are all already under discussion by Das Man. Even should something actually get done, idle talk will tend to undermine its reality, for it will already be considered passe! Being-with-one-another becomes a being-against-one-another as all come under mutual scrutinizing. Dasein is tranquilized by the "they" into feeling "secure" and "fulfilled" in a state of groundless fallenness. Yet even in this dazed condition, Dasein frantically continues to dissect, conceptualize and reconceptualize itself (1962:222f.). Only when such "normal" ways of acting and thinking are interrupted may one become aware of the radical contingency of oneself and all that one takes for granted (See Baumann, 1978:154-155). At moments of crisis, despair, or through special intellectual and emotional efforts one may come to grips with death and the nothingness (Das Nichts) at the center of ones being. Jaspers beautifully describes such "boundary situations" as follows:

My lonely self-being turns into the knowledge which in existence opens my mind to boundary situations; for fleeting moments only can it be a pure eye. As possible Existenz, sheltered as in a germ in this lonely punctuality of having stepped outside, I take my second leap to elucidation.... The world is now not just an object of knowledge to me, a thing I must not remain indifferent to - it also contains my own shaken self (1970:180).

The tendency towards inauthenticity is exacerbated by the current technological era, in which objects are seen primarily in relation to their use value. Rather than merely a personal attempt to conceal one's mortality, inauthenticity has become a "destiny" in western culture. Where everything is viewed as a commodity, individuals treat themselves and others as objects. In Heidegger's imagery, Being has concealed itself from the human world, allowing us to forget that we are openness for being:

Western man now understands himself as a self-willed Subject who regards everything as an object for economic exploitation. Western society is egoism on a planetary scale (Zimmerman 1981b:xxv).

This egoism manifests itself as an attempt to seek security by manipulating the world. The self-conscious self is technologized, reduced to a means to an end.

One must struggle as an individual to exist authentically by coming to grips with death and with the nothingness (Das Nichts) at the center of one's being. Only when normal activities are interrupted, or impinged upon by thinking, may one become aware of the radical contingency of oneself and all that one takes for granted (see Baumann, 1978:154-155).

### **Mead' self as use-value**

The Meadian self is born in self-consciousness. Embodying social roles and expectations, the self may become one's internal jail-keeper. As a performer of social roles one is always evaluated according to usage in relation to the other. One is either a good son, lover, wife, father, secretary, teacher, etc., or one is not. The ascendancy of the performance principle (Marcuse, 1966:44f.) is subtly facilitated by a pragmatic self concept such as that of George Herbert Mead. Since society is not in fact the participatory democracy envisioned by Mead, peopled by free souls who function like scientists or religious prophets, mass conformism is a pervasive aspect of contemporary life. Mead did not take adequately into account the way large-scale power interests could control the process of communication, and thereby regulate the minds and selves of citizens. Emotions are mass produced and managed through music, advertising, films and television (Hochschild, 1983). The mass media, for example, constitute a pervasively powerful "other" which effectively goads the self to perform, enjoy, look beautiful and win. Reisman describes this as an historical turn toward "other-direction" (1953).

It is not accidental that such selves make good consumers. Such selves are also programmed for psychological collapse should their egoistic endeavors not succeed (see Maddi, 1967). The increased need for counselors, therapists, and encounter groups attests to this reality. By providing jobs for such human service specialists, even the breakdown of selves contributes to the market economy. Such a frenetic consuming life-style is also related to the destruction of nature, for it necessitates wasteful use of resources and alienated labour (Merchant, 1980; Marx, 1964). Alienation and destruction are aspects of disownedness, and are opposed to Heideggerian care.

The self also has an "I" which acts upon others impulsively or creatively (1934:214). Through the use of reflectivity one may reject and seek to change existing conditions. However, all such outlets for the

"I" may function as "use" values in an exploitative economic or political environment. The acting self (the "I") also is useful in the constitution and control of other selves. By having expectations and making demands on the other, the acting "I" increases the use value of the other in the social process. Society then becomes a mutual stockpiling of persons for use. The belief in and reification of such selves for family and society is integral to technocratic social relationships.

### **Dasein exists as openness to other beings, Daseins and being**

Because of the Nothing (Das Nichts) underlying Dasein's existence there is the possibility of filling it with other beings and things. To Heidegger, things are participating in a fourfold universe. These are: earth, sky, mortals and immortals. Even a simple object like a jug of wine, to use Heidegger's example, presents itself to a Dasein open to its appearing as made from the earth and filled with its fruits, ripened and nourished by the sky's sun and rain. The wine is made by mortals and is consumed by them most meaningfully in awareness of their mortality and of their relations to the immortal meanings of the occasion.

Failure to recognize the way things gather these four together is inherent in the scientific view of the thing as object. Indeed, as Marcuse (1964) demonstrates, particularly in relation to the social sciences, operationalized definitions strip things of ontological and even cultural relatedness. The world of scientific objects destroys the world of things. In Heidegger's words:

Sciences' knowledge, which is compelling within its own sphere, the sphere of objects, already had annihilated things as things long before the atom bomb exploded. The bomb's explosion is only the grossest of all gross confirmations of the long since accomplished annihilation of the thing; the confirmation of the thing as thing remains nil (Heidegger, 1971:70).

Experientially, Dasein relates to things in an embodied manner realizing them as more or less "ready-to-hand." In relating to the ready-to-hand, Dasein may use something up, destroy it, or let it be free to exist in multiple relationships to other entities in the world (1962:118). In the current technological era, beings, plants, and animals, Being and other Daseins are presented as parts of "the standing reserve" (Das Gestell). Caring replaces exploitation with cultivation,

allowing a thing to develop according to its own inner nature, as in pruning a vine.

### **To Mead, organisms constitute objects**

Mead depicts the human being as a biological organism which constitutes objects through interaction with others in the environment. Mead views this process primarily in terms of the mutual adjustment of organisms:

... objects are constituted in terms of meanings within the social process of experience and behavior through the mutual adjustment to one another of the responses or actions of the various individual organisms involved in that process, an adjustment made possible by means of a communication which takes the form of a conversation of gestures in the earlier evolutionary stages of that process, and of language in its later stages (1934:77).

Mead goes on to say that such constitution of objects may go on without conscious awareness. To Heidegger, Dasein is a creature who may be open to an understanding of the true nature of other beings through a more passive, quiet waiting, a listening to what is already present. Mead's self, on the other hand, is the active constructor of the world. The significant symbol is simply a self-conscious gesture. Words are "tendencies to respond". Such a definition of symbol is useful for understanding the social coordination of action. However, it does not allow for a full realization of the symbolic.

### **Language as the "house of being"**

To Heidegger, the symbol is a manifestation of tradition in the present. The uncovering of the hidden aspects of language is a way to truth and a way to the disclosure of Being. Hermeneutic phenomenology strips away reified layers of meanings which conceal things in themselves. Thus the process of discovering the connotations of symbols works through tradition to an authentic insight (see Bove', 1980).

Heidegger writes of the alienation resulting from lack of awareness of how language shapes us as we simultaneously imagine it is shaped by us (1971:146). Lanigan points out that from a semiological perspective, inauthenticity occurs when signs are empty of actual reference to

things, while talk occurs as if this were not the case (1972:73). Idle talk uses signs devoid of original references.

Heidegger felt a kinship to poetics. For the poet works through language to transcend tradition and thereby uncovers an experience of Being. The symbol seen in this way involves a praxis whereby things are newly experienced. This allows an openness to Being which frees one to know and appreciate rather than use. It also allows for a de-centering away from Humanity as the ultimate end of Being.

Heidegger's practice is post-humanist in that it would put human beings in perspective of the beingness of other creatures and things. Human beings are not glorified ends, but possess unique opennesses through which the plural aspects of Being may be recognized (see Fraser, 1981; and Zimmerman, 1981). Because it is a hermeneutical phenomenology, Heideggerian praxis does not seek legitimating structures and power hierarchies. Rather, its ongoing concern to reveal things as they are in time is fundamentally anarchistic.

### **Behavior as the "house of symbols"**

To Mead, words are "tendencies to respond". They are calls to action. Symbols reflect situations and objects which have socially shared meanings. Such a definition of symbol is useful for conceiving of the coordination of action. However, Mead's gesturally based definition of symbol undercuts a realization of the essence of the symbolic realm, especially as richly historically situated. Mead's analysis of symbol is related to that of his teacher, Wilhelm Wundt, an experimental behaviorist. Wundt's variety of physiological psychology was radically criticized by Husserl (1970:12).

The complexity of symbolic experience is not describable within the Meadian framework. In Heideggerian terms, Being does not reveal itself through such a framework, except perhaps through a crack in its imagery. As Schurmann (1978) points out, a realization of the symbolic difference in Heidegger allows for a destruction of power distortions. The etymology of the word "symbol" relates to the "thrown togetherness" of unlikes. The symbol which is present takes the place of what is unseen.

The Meadian "symbol", with its three parts — symbol, subject and object — is called by Langer not "symbol" but "sign". A symbol to Langer includes a fourth element, unseen, but thought. This is the "conception" behind the symbol (Langer, 1951:63f.). It is this which

allows for diversity, multiplicity and many-facetedness of meanings. In this regard the Meadian conception of symbols does not allow for what the ethnomethodologists have found, namely that mutuality of conception and reciprocity of perspectives are "assumed" in interaction, but frequently (if not usually) do not actually exist (Leiter, 1980).

Mead's threefold definition of symbol does not make it clear that the symbol is a conception – with connotations as well as denotations. This is what makes for the thrown-togetherness of the hidden sense and manifest senses of the symbol. The sedimented layers of historical consciousness which rest on the symbol are ignored; rather, only immediate action as related to an object is viewed as meaning. This does not allow for the crack of ambiguity in experience. It denies the ontological nothingness (Das Nichts) which underlies experience and which allows for creative change in a world blocked by power-saturated discourse.

Mead's concept of the symbol ignores the grammatical, logical and rhetorical aspects of natural language which makes meaning possible (see Holenstein, 1976). Indeed, Mead was logically obliged to forsake these aspects of language in order to attempt to ground meaning in action (1936:402–403). Thus, social psychologists who follow this truncated concept of meaning will look only to immediately observable behavior as meanings. Such narrowly focused interpretations belie the richness of human experience, as well as strip meanings of their historical roots.

Communication viewed as a "conversation of gestures", as it is by Mead, is the direct result of his desire to ground social interaction biologically without relying on a notion of consciousness. Thinking, to Mead, is a silent process of gesturing to oneself or to imagined objects (1936:403f.). The concept of gesture makes gigantic leaps in Meadian thought as an explanation of everything from dog fights to the League of Nations! (Eames in Corti, 1973:49–55).

What happens when one atrophies the definitions and functions of the symbol as Mead did is that one prevents awareness of the ontological grounding of communication. Poetic experience cannot be explained in this way, nor the continued need for reflectivity. The potential richness of symbolic experience is negated in favor of efficient coordination of a technologized social life.

### **Dasein exists always in a mood (Befindlichkeit)**

Dasein's understanding, which rests upon speech, always occurs in a particular way. Mood is "how one finds oneself" ("Wie finden Sie sich?") Dasein always exists in a feeling state, even if this state is just numbness:

The fact that moods can deteriorate and can change over means simply that in every case Dasein always has some mood. The pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood, which is often persistent and which is not to be mistaken for a bad mood, is far from nothing at all. Rather, it is in this that Dasein became satiated with itself. Being has become manifest as a burden (1962:173).

Even a mood of elation after a bad mood testifies to the "burden-some character of Dasein, even while it alleviates the burden" (ibid.). It is impossible for Dasein to cognitively comprehend why moods occur. The modes of awareness interwoven with the existence of moods stretches beyond cognition in a primordial manner. Dasein "can should and must" master its moods, using will and awareness. However ontologically mood is primordial to volition and cognition. Moods are after all not driven away. They are only replaced by other moods (1962:175).

Dasein exists always in an affective way at a fundamental level. Because Dasein is concerned with the world, is "in-the-world" Dasein's situations matter (1962:176). Even an "indifferent" affect already implies this fundamental care, rooted in understanding one's situation. Heidegger says:

... all understanding is essentially related to an affective self-finding which belongs to understanding itself. To be affectively self-finding is the formal structure of what we call mood, passion, affect, and the like, which are constitutive for all comportments toward beings, although they do not by themselves make such comportment possible but always only in one with understanding, which gives its light to each mood, each passion, each affect (1982:281).

Mood is the ontological baseline relating to the world and beings. Dasein always talks with another in a particular mood based on awareness of the situation. Only from such a baseline may Dasein experience emotional heights and depths, anguish and joy.



### **Mead treats states of mind as emotions**

Heidegger's notion of mood or state of mind is absent in Mead, who views the human self from outside; as a reflective organism, neglecting the affectual weave throughout the fabric of human experience. Here again, his implied scientific ontology sweeps the phenomenological realities of experience under the carpet. Mead tangentially (see Franks, 1984) attempts to explain overt overflows of moods as emotional outbursts which are predictable responses to stimuli. Emotions emerge as a result of repressed social actions. They are aroused in the conversation of gestures:

... the movements which constitute this field of conduct are themselves not the complete acts which they start out to become. They are the glance of the eye that is the beginning of the spring or the flight, the attitude of the body with which the spring or flight commences, the growl, or cry, or snarl with which the respiration adjusts itself to oncoming struggle, and they all change with the answering attitudes, glances of the eye, growls and snarls which are the beginning of action which they themselves aroused.

Back of these manifestations lie the emotions which the checking of the acts inevitably arouse. Fear, anger, lust of hunger and sex, all the gamut of emotions arise back of the activities of fighting, and feeding, and reproduction, because these activities are for the moment stopped in the process of readjustment (1964:124-125).

Mead explains the affect *annui* in behavioral terms as the result of a lack of new stimuli (1938:6). Emotions are unintended by-products of the processes of mutual adjustment, constituting communication. They are resultant from action frustrated by the response of the other. They are vitality excessive over reasonable expression in a social situation. Or, affective response occurs as a result of a consummatory experience (1938:455) as when an artist finishes a painting. Conversely, the lack of consummatory experiences would promote sadness.

Mead's idea of reason is the sharing of responses through significant gestures or symbols (1934:148 and 334), resulting in emotions. Hurt, fear, anger and anxiety result from conflicting purposes between actors. Contrarily, joy, triumph and peaceful emotions would follow congruent social actions. Particularly intense emotions result from complete identification of self with others. Such ecstatic experiences allow for a "fusion of the "I" and the "me". Shared laughter represents the joy of recognition of common human foibles. Shared philan-

thropic activities, work groups, and team activities, are joyful situations insofar as all share expectations and attributions of others (1934: 271f.). Such socially generated "highs" can also occur in activities of a negative character, such as in the shared frenzy of the KKK lynch mob. Emotions are "overflow" responses to situations – they are effects. Nowhere in Mead's analysis do we come to understand the necessary intrinsic pervasivity of mood for a being-in-the-world who is constituted so as to be inherently concerned about him/herself in a particular situation. Nowhere in Mead's work do we glimpse mood as a necessary underpinning for any emotional experience.

### **Dasein exists as temporality**

Temporality is more primordial than sensibility, mind, and reason. Time is inherently ecstatic – outside of itself – for the future Dasein is "carried away to its past" as present Dasein is carried away to things and beings beyond itself (1982:267). It is the "for-the-sake-of" which allows everything to exist. Time is the horizon which allows all beings to come forth into the world. Time is nothing, opening itself through unfolding. Time does not "pass by" or "remain" but temporalizes, allowing the existence of Dasein:

But every Dasein reveals time itself – and yet time long remains something strange. Only seldom do we take possession of time, which possesses our very selves in a metaphysical sense; only seldom do we become master of this power which we ourselves are; only seldom do we exist freely (1984:199).

Time presents itself as expectance, retention, and making present. In the mode of authenticity expectance is to approach oneself in one's own capacity for being (1984:205). Having-been is the way Dasein incorporates its own unique past. The primary way of having-been is forgetting. What is retained can be remembered – that is it may be retained with changed understanding. Therefore Dasein's past is not "over and done with":

Dasein can as little get rid of its bygoneness as escape its death. In every sense and in every case everything we have been is an essential determination of our existence. Even if in some way, by some manipulation, I may be able to keep my bygoneness far from myself, nevertheless, forgetting, repressing, suppressing are modes in which I myself am my own having-been-ness. The Dasein, in being, necessarilly always has been (1982:265–266).

Each remembrance of what is truly one's own is a recreation of the past. Thus Heidegger images the past as stretching out ahead of us, as when one looks out the window of a train while sitting backwards.

Heidegger points out that in understanding one's past merely in relation to things which exist in clock time one is relating to things which do not exist. Such things can never "have been" because once gone they are simply over and done with (1984:290). The present allows for the "having-been", and the future as "for-the-sake-of-which" to occur. The present as expectance and remembrance has the character of the "augenblick" (the instant) of authentic understanding. Time is inherently transcendent.

Temporality is not time as the clock measures it to facilitate the traffic of our lives. It is not an infinity of nows, nor can it adequately be conceived of spatially, as if it were a long cord, indefinitely reaching out into space. Only in inauthentic involvement with objects does temporality appear infinite. In the mode of Western metaphysical thinking, particularly in the mode of modern science, time is spatially conceived, and is thought of as infinity. Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of time reveals that this belief is a deception, characteristic of inauthentic everydayness (1982:272).

"Significance" is the ecstasis whereby Dasein, as an inherently worldly being, exists as in-order-to. Everything is of significance because it has a projected future. For existant beings, especially for Dasein, there can be a right time or wrong time. An attempt at fertilization can be made, but if the egg was not ready, no new being will come into existence.

Each now partakes in the second ecstasis "datability" in that for Dasein it is always a now "when" something occurs and becomes or will be a "then." Moments are thus uniquely definable and identifiable. This means that time is inherently related to happenings of a particular time (1982:262f.).

Just as it is datable, so time is "enpresented" as spannedness. It is always a particular "meanwhile" from one "then" to another. Time stretches on, extends itself from one moment to the next. For example, as I write this sentence, temporality is stretched from the beginning of it until the end. When I go on to write the next, it continues the span. When I tire for the evening the spannedness of my writing today comes to an end. The final ecstasis of Heideggerian time is publicness. Even alone in my study writing, this particular "now" which I am experiencing is being experienced by each of you. "The now is accessible to everyone and thus belongs to none" (1982:264).

These ecstases of time are not recognized in the inauthentic mode of being. Here experience is not determined by its own nature, but by others, circumstances, events, and objects. The "instant" may be grasped in its true possibilities by "resoluteness". Through resoluteness one is aware of the uniqueness of oneself as presented in a particular moment. It involves individuation rather than a frantic clinging to others out of a feeling of inadequacy. Authentic "being-with-others" does not mean narcissistically running after one's own interest, but "being free for the factual possibilities of current existence" (1982: 288).

Inauthenticity, or the mode of everydayness, ignores the finitude of existence. One acting inauthentically has not grasped fully the inevitable facticity of one's own death. One is caught in the world of everydayness, insignificant prattle, and unappreciative uses of persons, animals and the physical world. Both finitude and the way experience is temporally structured are hidden from awareness.

#### **Mead's view of space-time as inauthenticity**

The essences of Heidegger's ecstases are not basic to Mead's <sup>who</sup> ~~Meadian time~~, conceptualized time by way of theoretical physics. He was not generally concerned with time as experienced, except in his brief treatment of imagery of the past and the future in the present (1959). While for Mead, human experience was processual, it was not perceived as constituted fundamentally by and in Temporality. Mead gave pre-dominance to the present:

The subject of this lecture is the proposition that reality exists in a present. The present of course implies a past and a future, and to these we deny existence ... The world is a world of events (ibid.:1).  
1959

By contrast (1962:41) Heidegger gives predominance to a reaching ahead to the future (1962:41) while incorporating one's bygone-ness:

The primal phenomenon of ground is the for-the-sake-of, which belongs to transcendence. ... Freedom as the ecstatic becoming-toward-possibilities is thus, in itself, a swinging-over into possibilities. Insofar then as freedom (taken transcendently) constitutes the essence of Dasein, Dasein, as existing, is always, in essence, necessarily "further" than any given factual being (1984:215).

Heidegger here continues to explain that in spite of this "upswing" of freedom inherent to Dasein, Dasein is powerless in a metaphysical sense against the resistance of beings. This powerlessness cannot even be overcome by the "unshackled beast" of technology. Rather, Dasein can attain freedom only within human history. Because of his concern for the future, Heidegger questions the ideal of inevitable scientific and technological progress which was so wholeheartedly accepted by Mead. Heidegger viewed this dogma as indicative of the egoism of modern Western thought.

Mead's detailed analysis of the experience of time centers on the behavioral act, abstracted from the phenomenological experience of it. Heidegger's focus is on understanding human existence in full awareness of what persons with emotions confront and ignore. Heidegger's view of time takes into account the facticity of death, the reality of despair and the horizon of nothingness that underlies being.

Heidegger's phenomenological ecstases of temporality are not approached by Mead. Unconcerned with an ontology of Dasein as existing in the world, Mead views experience as determined by a world of others, circumstances, events and objects. This is exactly a conceptual mode which Heidegger found to be inauthentic, or "fallen". Mead, like his ideal theoretical scientist, viewed time-space as infinite. Datability as an *ecstasis* is not recognized by Mead with the same sense of potential tragedy as it is in Heidegger. As Heidegger says:

Again, to be a self is to be the temporal openness of truth in which beings can be revealed. To be a self in the most suitable way is to be wholly open to those possibilities which are uniquely one's own (quoted in Zimmerman, 1981b:31).

This sense of the uniqueness of the existential moment is not thematized by Mead.

Similarly, publicness is only grasped by Mead as a shared meaning. For Heidegger, there need be no communication for each now to be open to be experienced by all other Daseins. It is an essential fate of all of Dasein's "nows". This does not carry the connotation of any "now" being the property of the generalized other or a reflective reaction against it, as in Mead.

Mead's model of the processual stages in the act is similarly revealing of what amounts to a technological conception of self. The act has four moments, which may be collapsed, but which must be occurring in order for an act to be experienced. These are impulse, perception,

manipulation and consummation (1938:3–25). However, in this conceptualization, Mead is not concerned with a span of time from here to there or from now to now as experienced. Rather, he is describing a biosocial process underlying all action and predetermining its course. The overall focus in this Meadian framework is on how objects are manipulated and then consummated – used:

The world about us is a set of ends to be reached or avoided, and the spatiotemporal distance of the ends is organized in perception as the means by which these ends may be so reached or avoided (1938:174).

This is hardly similar in spirit to Heidegger's "spannedness".

The Meadian world is a world of tools and things, and all of our actions are pragmatically based. Everything from the child sticking a toy in its mouth up to an appreciation of a Rembrandt, all acts are guided by the urge to manipulate and consume objects. Heidegger criticizes just such a limited concept of human existence. Like the self, temporality is capable of showing itself as something it is not. Mead's concept of time is in the realm of semblance and appearance, masking "that which shows itself as itself" (Heidegger, 1962:55).

### Summary and conclusion

Heidegger was sceptical of the approach of modern science since it ignored the ontological quest. Dasein, which must know of its own existence is a window for Being. Dasein exists as being-in-the-world. He/she is always alongside other beings and things and shares interests with them. Dasein exists as care, of whatever quality, regardless if the quality is one of neglect. Even when alone, and thinking, the other and Dasein are intrinsically interwoven. Furthermore, the way in which Dasein exists is a matter of choice for Dasein, whether Dasein acts resolutely or neglects to choose. Such neglect makes it likely that Dasein will be caught in everydayness – the mode of inauthenticity. Especially in the current technological era, all persons and objects are reified as mere commodities. In the mode of inauthenticity, Dasein is caught up in an egoism which seeks security by manipulating self, other and the world. Only when Dasein looks at things in their fourfold relation to earth, sky, mortals and immortals can they be appreciated as beings in their fullness. The scientific-technocratic view

of things as objects to be stockpiled for use denies and annihilates this view of things.

A sensitized, poetic view of language allows for such an appreciative grasp of beings. Language as the house of Being is treated in its symbolic complexity by Heidegger. The uncovering of the past meanings of words gives partial insight into what is forced out of awareness by technocratic language. Dasein exists always in a mood. As one is thrown into the world, one also must always have a mood, even if it is blank.

Dasein experiences everything in and through the ecstases of time. For Dasein, time is right or wrong. It is significant for Dasein for each moment is datable. It has a particular span from one now to the next, here to there, and it exists for each Dasein simultaneously. In inauthenticity the choice, the fullness of meaning, the destiny and transcendences of each moment are overlooked.

Mead views the self from the perspective of the detached scientific observer. The self is objectified as a distinct entity by the internalization of others' objectifications of it. Other and self are intricately inter-related, yet each are still substantial entities. Reflectivity allows one to choose to accept or reject the expectations and attributions of others and society. Nevertheless, in many instances, one acts without the use of this reflective capacity. Mead's pragmatic approach to the human self shows no concern for the various qualitative ways one may exist. It is perfectly within his viewpoint to see self and other as mutual pragmatic objects. Mead does not concern himself with problems of mass conformity, alienation, and repressive political and economic power. He believed that participatory democracy would become more universal, and hence society was constantly moving in a more ethical direction. The ongoing constitution of things as objects for use by modern scientific civilization was viewed by Mead without qualm. For Mead, language is an expanded instrumentality, allowing for the constitution of objects and shared meanings. Symbols always are tied to acts and purposes in the immediate present.

Mead's rational approach to the self gives little attention to moods or emotions. The neglect of such an intrinsically important aspect of life serves a purpose for Mead's self. Such an emotionless self can continue more unashamedly in its pragmatic activities, without disruptive intrusions which may open flood gates upon the edifice of his socially constructed self.

For Mead time is spatial. Each act is temporalized by its modes of using objects leading to consummation. Experience is structured temporally within behavioral acts. Time is an external necessity to which the human world relates by way of purposes.

## Implications for research

Social psychological research based on Heidegger's ontology <sup>of</sup> persons as Daseins would seek to better understand Dasein's experience. These studies could be carried out from so-called micro to macro levels of analysis. The research could focus on a particular Dasein or a collectivity of persons. For example, one could study a man convicted of rape, or a collectivity of fifty men convicted of rape. In so doing one could arrive at a deeper understanding of experiences indicative of "fallenness" in Heidegger's sense.

At the level of groups, one could analyze the communicative processes, for example at board or committee meetings, or among jurors. One could look for the assumed and expressed understanding of the group members as they interact according to the above questions. For example, is the mood of the group solemn, joyful, or of flat affect? Are descriptions lively or routinized and cliched? Are objects and events appreciated in the fourfold sense or only as useful objects? Are the uniqueness <sup>of</sup> of the moment at all realized?

At the cultural level, one could examine key documents of the culture for insights into which manifestations of Dasein are allowed, sanctioned, prescribed, or prohibited. Heidegger himself had begun this in his analysis of technology. Such cultural phenomena as laws, advertisements, films, corporate management manuals, catechisms and sermons, newspapers, could be analyzed for the way time, the fourfold, the relationship to things and objects, and the modes of caring are expressed.

Social psychology would gain a rich and critical insight into human experience by conducting research based on Heidegger's ontology. Moreover, research with Dasein as a conceptual starting point would allow for appreciative understanding leading to <sup>care</sup> care as opposed to prediction and control — the hallmarks of scientific research.

Perhaps of more importance than a changed thematic focus would be a changed way of doing research. The details of a Heideggerian social psychological research "method" is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a few characteristics of such research may be suggested. Dasein-centered research would become a more <sup>quantitative</sup> ~~reflective~~ process of thinking of ones being in time in relation to others. It would have to be structured to allow for understanding as a reaching-ahead towards ones having been. Social psychology must not close off thought by theoretical categories or research methodologies, but rather it must clear openings in which multiple modes of being can reveal themselves.



It must stress cultivation and care, rather than the dissection, and imprisonment and conditioning of beings (see Malhotra, 1984). It must not violate the being and presenting of other beings for egoistic purposes.

#### NOTES

1. Heidegger's "Dasein" is conventionally left untranslated so as not to lose the German connotations of being "there", "when", "as", and "at".
2. Thanks to Richard Olwsley for introducing me to the contemplation of Heidegger. Thanks also to two anonymous reviewers of *Human Studies*, whose thoughtful suggestions helped make this a better paper. Leo Papa's helpful criticisms were appreciated. Charles Glasgow's enthusiastic response to an earlier version of this paper and its relevance for sociological theory was motivating. No one but the author is accountable for the content of this paper.
3. See Erving Goffman (1965:132f. and 1969). In a letter to Kenneth Burke, Goffman admits to having a "marketing" model of self and attributes this to a "childhood trauma in father's shop". Undated letter, aprox. 1964, Correspondence between Hugh Dalziel Duncan and Kenneth Burke, 1938-1970. Southern Illinois University Archives, Carbondale, Illinois.

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